Be concise.

One of the best ways to improve your legal writing is to make it more concise.

You hear it all the time: “Legal writing should be concise.” But what does that mean?

Forming a good argument requires informing the reader of the necessary background information but removing the fluff.

This is something that takes practice. (See how I originally wrote that sentence versus the edit? It means the same thing but is much more concise.)

The key to being concise is removing extra words and phrases that don’t add substance or value to the argument.

Get out the red pen.

Shorten phrases.

So many phrases, especially in legal writing, use extra, unnecessary words. One way to make your writing more concise is to go back through and remove extra words in the editing phase.

We’ve had this conversation on LinkedIn a couple times, and I’ve kept an ongoing list of ways to edit common phrases to be more concise:

• at the time - when

• in order to - to

• in order for - for

• prior to - before

• subsequent to - after

• in front of - before

• had a meeting with - met with

• it is plaintiff’s belief – plaintiff believes

• in regards to - regarding or about

• Plaintiff instituted an action - Plaintiff sued

• the Plaintiff's allegations are that - Plaintiff alleges

• the instant case – this case or here

• filed a motion – moved

• pursuant to – under

• for the reasons stated above – for those reasons or therefore

Streamline your sentences.

Making your writing more concise goes further than editing phrases. Look at your sentences and see if you can make them more streamlined.

Here’s the Abstract from my latest law review article:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) and Hurst v. Florida (2016) are two critical parts of the jurisprudence related to capital defendants’ right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Each clarified capital defendants’ rights under the Sixth Amendment. While the new rules announced in Ring and Hurst seemed clear at the time, courts have grappled with how to apply them for years—in part, whether the new rules apply retroactively to defendants whose capital sentences were final when the opinions were issued. As this article explains, courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether the new rules announced in Ring and Hurst apply retroactively. This article attempts to unravel the confusion surrounding the retroactivity of these landmark decisions.

Ultimately, this article explains that the case law regarding the retroactive application of Ring was mostly consistent. A close examination of the case law reveals that the confusion arose after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst. This article identifies four points of confusion that arose surrounding the retroactivity of Ring and Hurst: (1) Was Hurst a direct result of Ring?; If so, should it apply retroactively?; (2) What role did the Eighth Amendment play in both Ring and Hurst?; (3) Why did some courts reach divergent conclusions on Hurst retroactivity even in applying the same federal standard?; (4) Does the Florida Supreme Court’s invention of partial retroactivity for Hurst make sense? By exploring and explaining these sources of confusion, this article aims to help clarify the broader landscape of modern capital sentencing jurisprudence. Further, this article explains that the resolution to such uncertainty likely lies in the U.S. Supreme Court clarifying the distinction between the roles of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in capital sentencing.

That version (the published version) is 292 words. Here are the readability stats:¹

• Flesch Reading Ease: 39.7

• Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 13.2

• Passive: 0%

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Here are some edits to make it more concise:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) and Hurst v. Florida (2016) are two critical parts of the jurisprudence related to capital defendants’ right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Each clarified capital defendants’ rights under the Sixth Amendment. While the new rules announced in Ring and Hurst seemed clear at the time, courts have grappled with how to apply them for years—in part, whether the new rules apply retroactively to defendants whose capital sentences were final when the opinions were issued. As this article explains, courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether the new rules announced in Ring and Hurst apply retroactively. This article attempts to unravel that confusion surrounding the retroactivity of these landmark decisions.

Ultimately, this article explains that the case law regarding the retroactive application of Ring was mostly consistent. A close examination of the case law reveals that the confusion arose after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst. Specifically, this article identifies four points of confusion that arose surrounding the retroactivity of Ring and Hurst: (1) Was Hurst a direct result of Ring?; If so, should it apply retroactively?; (2) What role did the Eighth Amendment play in both Ring and Hurst?; (3) Why did some courts reach divergent conclusions on Hurst retroactivity even in applying the same federal standard?; (4) Does the Florida Supreme Court’s invention of partial retroactivity for Hurst make sense? By Exploring and explaining these sources of confusion, this article aims to help clarify the broader landscape of modern capital sentencing jurisprudence. Further, this article explains that the resolution to such uncertainty likely lies in the U.S. Supreme Court clarifying the distinction between the roles of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in capital sentencing.

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Here it is rewritten:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) and Hurst v. Florida (2016) are two critical parts of the jurisprudence related to capital defendants’ right to trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Each clarified capital defendants’ rights under the Sixth Amendment. While the new rules announced in Ring and Hurst seemed clear, courts have grappled with how to apply them for years—in part, whether the new rules apply retroactively to defendants whose capital sentences were final when the opinions were issued. As this article explains, courts have reached divergent conclusions on whether the rules announced in Ring and Hurst apply retroactively. This article attempts to unravel that confusion.

Ultimately, this article explains that the case law regarding the retroactive application of Ring was mostly consistent. A close examination of the case law reveals that the confusion arose after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hurst. Specifically, this article identifies four points of confusion that arose: (1) Was Hurst a direct result of Ring?; If so, should it apply retroactively?; (2) What role did the Eighth Amendment play in both Ring and Hurst?; (3) Why did some courts reach divergent conclusions on Hurst retroactivity even in applying the same federal standard?; (4) Does the Florida Supreme Court’s invention of partial retroactivity for Hurst make sense? Exploring and explaining these sources of confusion, this article aims to clarify the broader landscape of capital sentencing jurisprudence. Further, this article explains that the resolution likely lies in the U.S. Supreme Court clarifying the distinction between the roles of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments in capital sentencing.

This revised version is 269 words but says the exact same thing. Here are the new readability stats:

• Flesch Reading Ease: 41.1

• Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 12.6

• Passive: 0%

It made a difference!

This kind of editing takes some judgment. I could’ve removed more, but I would’ve lost some value with the flow of the sentences and ideas (more on that later).

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1. For Flesch readability, you want to aim for >50 reading ease, <11 grade level & 0% passive.